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CHALLENGING THE FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS AGGRAVATING FACTOR
BY: MICHAEL H. SPENCER
[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter
so grave as the determination of whether a human life should
be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.
Gregg v. Georgia.1
Part of a State's responsibility in this regard is to define the
crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that
obviates "standardless [sentencing] discretion." It must chan-
nel the sentencer's discretion by "clear and objective stan-
dards" that provide "specific and detailed guidance," and that




Gregg and Godfrey were intended to provide a basic framework by
which to narrow death penalty statutes and eliminate the arbitrary and
capricious implementation of the death penalty. Nevertheless, courts
throughout the Commonwealth have failed to adhere to this mandate.
Even though these mandated standards encompass all aspects of death
penalty law, courts in particular have failed to provide specific and
detailed guidance in construing the scope of the "future dangerousness"
aggravating factor. This note will look at how to challenge the
Commonwealth's use of future dangerousness both as a constitutional
matter and as an evidentiary matter at trial.
I. The Vagueness Of The Future Dangerousness Aggravating
Factor
After the United States Supreme Court rulings in Furman v.
Georgia,3 Gregg, Jurek v. Texas,4 and their progeny, Virginia created
two aggravating factors to meet the constitutional requirements of
narrowing the class of death eligible defendants and guiding the jury's
discretion. These aggravators consist of the "vileness" factor and the
"future dangerousness" factor. The United States Supreme Court has
spoken directly about the vileness factor, holding that its statutory
language is unconstitutionally vague absent a sufficient narrowing
construction that is communicated to the jury or applied at the appellate
level.5 In striking down the vileness factor, the Court stated that "[t]here
is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence. ' 6
These constitutional deficiencies are also present in Virginia's
1428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
2446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980).
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4428 U.S. 262 (1976).
5 Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright,
486 U.S. 356, 362-64 (1988); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-433.
6 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
7 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4 (C) (1995) (emphasis added).
8 SeeBreard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68,86-87,445 S.E.2d 670,
681 (1994)(allowing the Commonwealth to introduce unadjudicated acts
application of the future dangerousness aggravating factor. Section 19.2-
264.4(C) of the Virginia Code states in part that:
[t]he penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Common-
wealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is
accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society .... 7
Many of the terms used to define the aggravator have no clear
meaning or scope. Furthermore, there is no narrowing construction for
this amorphous language or effort at the appellate level to confine the
application of this aggravating factor.
The phrase "prior history," for instance, does not denote whether or
not the statute refers to prior adjudicated or unadjudicated acts. As it
currently stands, the prosecution can introduce evidence of prior acts
without any requirement that such acts be adequately proven.
8 Without
further clarification, the Commonwealth can introduce evidence of prior
criminal history that has not been proven by any standard, let alone
beyond a reasonable doubt. Allowing a capitaljury to hear such evidence
without any meaningful controls over its veracity or relevance resembles
the "standardless sentencing discretion" condemned by the Court in
Godfrey.
The future dangerousness aggravator also asks the jury to determine
if the defendant will be a "continuing serious threat to society."9 What is
the meaning of "serious" and "society?"
The term "serious" is defined by Webster's New World Dictionary
as "giving cause for concem." 10 Such language, however, does not
clarify the meaning of this term in the constitutional sense of ensuring
that juries will not apply it in an arbitrary fashion. When the Court in
Godfrey dealt with "vileness," the Court stated that "[a] person of
ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as
'outrageously or wantonly vile . .. ."'11 Such a deficiency is also
applicable to the term "serious." A person of ordinary sensibility could
consider every defendant convicted of a murder as a continuing serious
threat to society.
Furthermore, this phrase does not instruct ajury that the threatened
"society" would be that of the prison community, given that all capital
murder convictions now result in a minimum punishment of life without
parole. 12 In other words, a jury should be instructed to consider the
probability that the defendant would be a "continuing serious threat to
society" within the context of the life imprisonment regimen. The
absence of such a necessary construction allows ajury to define "society"
in an arbitrary fashion. The jury must be told that, once convicted of a
capital crime, the defendant faces either life imprisonment without
parole or death.
without proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
such acts) and case summary of Breard, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7,
No. 1, p. 19 (1994).
9 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C) (1995).
10 Webster's New World Dictionary 1225 (3d Ed. 1988).
11 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29.
12 A defendant convicted of a capital crime committed after January
1, 1995 can only be sentenced to either life imprisonment with no parole
or death. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-165.1 (1995).
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The statute's use of the term "probability" is also vague because this
term has three commonly acceptable meanings, thereby failing to guide
a sentencer's discretion. Mathematically speaking, a"probability" means
a chance an event will occur, regardless of how remote. 13 A "probability"
has also been construed to mean a greater than 50% likelihood that an
event will occur. 14 It may also mean a high likelihood. 15 Each of these
interpretations are semantically valid, yet the sentencer is not instructed
upon which construction to rely when conducting its "future dangerous-
ness" analysis. This is contrary to the state's constitutional obligation to
limit the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty.
16
The vagueness problem with "probability" is further heightened
because of how the term is used within the statute. Section 19.2-264.4(C)
of the Virginia Code provides that this "probability" must be proven by
the Commonwealth "beyond a reasonable doubt." When applying the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, a jury is required to find a very
high likelihood of something being true. So when ajury is subsequently
asked to find a probability beyond a reasonable doubt, confusion can
occur. Simply stated, the jury is asked to find a "very high probability"
that there is a "probability" that the defendant will be dangerous in the
future. As one commentator has observed, the phrase "probability
beyond a reasonable doubt" ---"is and can be only puzzling-even mind
boggling - to a jury or to anybody.'
' 17
Such language reveals the inherent vagueness and unconstitution-
ality of the futuredangerousness aggravating factor, yetjuries in Virginia
are consistently asked to interpret such language without guidance. Such
circumstances increase the likelihood that juries will arbitrarily impose
the death penalty since they must guess as to the meaning of "probabil-
ity." The jury's lack of guidance is further exacerbated by the statutory
verdict form given to the jury which does not even contain the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" language but only states the word "probability."
18
As a result, an even greater likelihood exists that an already confused jury
will not use the proper standard of proof, but will instead find only a
"probability" of "future dangerousness" and impose the death penalty. 19
The vagueness of the future dangerousness factor was raised in
Mickens v. Commonwealth.20 The court, however, rejected the claim,
observing that in a prior case it had defined "probability" as "'a reason-
able "probability," i.e., a likelihood substantially greater than a mere
13 Charles Black, Jr., Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and
Companion Cases, 26 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1, 4 (1976).
14 Id. at 5.
15 id.
16 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
17 Black, supra note 13, at 4.
18The verdict form underVa. CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.4(D)(1) (1995)
states that "We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant
guilty of (here set out statutory language of the offense charged) and that
(after consideration of his prior history that there is a probability that he
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing serious threat to society) or his conduct in committing the offense is
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
(torture) (depravity of mind) (aggravated battery to the victim), and
having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unani-
mously fix his punishment at death.
Signed ..................... foreman" (emphasis added).
19See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring); Gregg,
428 U.S. at 183 (1976); Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
20 247 Va. 395,403, 442 S.E.2d 678, 684 (1994).
21 Id. at 403, 442 S.E.2d at 684.
possibility,' that an accused would commit violent acts in the future...
.,21 The problem is that the court did not require that the jury be given
this definition, leaving them to flounder on a misleading verdict form.
Accordingly, the "future dangerousness" aggravating factor is unconsti-
tutionally vague on its face and as applied by Virginia courts.
Consequently, it is evident that the statutory language of section
19.2-264.4(C) does not meaningfully narrow the class of death eligible
defendants or guide the jury's discretion as is constitutionally required
for the similarly situated vileness aggravating factor. The current system
is no more than an unfocused appeal to a jury's fear, thus creating an
arbitrary and capricious application of the future dangerousness aggra-
vating factor.
II. Pretrial Litigation Of The Commonwealth's Proof Of Future
Dangerousness
At the penalty phase of a capital case, few restrictions apply to what
the Commonwealth may introduce to prove a defendant's future danger-
ousness. 22 Therefore, many acts committed and allegedly committed by
the defendant, including unadjudicated acts, may be proffered without
even meeting a threshold of minimal reliability.23 Such circumstances
have led to the introduction of evidence ranging from tampering with
vending machines24 to bigamy.
25
Due to the amount of leeway given to the Commonwealth during
sentencing, it is necessary for the Virginia attorney to begin an attack on
the future dangerousness aggravating factor even before the guilt phase
begins. This pre-trial litigation is currently one of the only avenues
afforded a defense attorney in creating the leverage necessary to combat
the future dangerousness aggravating factor.
The goal of pre-trial litigation is to create a mini-trial. The rationale
behind such a concept is to apprise the Commonwealth of the defense's
intent to closely scrutinize every maneuver made by the Commonwealth.
This is not a delaying tactic, but part of being a zealous advocate. By
approaching "future dangerousness" evidence with this attitude in mind,
a defense team can begin to create the parity necessary to effectively
assist a capital case defendant.
22 Section 19.2-264.4(B) (1995) of the Virginia Code allows the
jury to view evidence as to "any matter which the court deems relevant
to sentenc[ing]." The only exceptions consist of reports pursuant to
§ 19.2-299 of the Virginia Code or any rule of court.
23 The Supreme Court of Virginia did, however, state in Chichester
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 327, 448 S.E.2d 638, 649 (1994), that
"[i]f the evidence of other crimes bears sufficient marks of similarity to
the crime charged to establish that the defendant is probably the
common perpetrator, that evidence is relevant and admissible if its
probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect," (emphasis added).
Therefore, it should be argued that this is the applicable standard the
Commonwealth must meet in orderto introduce evidence ofunadjudicated
acts. For a detailed analysis of the need for a standard of some proof for
unadjudicated acts see Fenn, Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will
be UsedAgainst You in a Court of Law: The Use of Unadjudicated Acts
in Capital Sentencing, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31
(1993).
24 See Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482,496,404 S.E.2d
227, 236 (1991).
25 See King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 370,416 S.E.2d 669,
678 (1992).
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A. Bill of Particulars
As in any other case, a motion for a bill of particulars is para-
mount.26 This simple motion, made pursuant to section 19.2-266.2 of the
Virginia Code, orders the Commonwealth to identify the grounds for the
capital murder charge and upon what aggravating factors it intends to
rely. 27 Furthermore, in cases in which the Commonwealth relies on
future dangerousness, section 19.2-264.3:2 requires the Commonwealth
to identify what acts it will introduce to show this aggravator.28 The
information gained from this motion can give the defense team a
foundation from which to build a penalty phase defense. 29 Additionally,
this motion pins the Commonwealth down on what aggravating factors
it will pursue and by what means it will prove them.
B. Discovery Motions
In addition to a bill of particulars, the defense attorney must file
standard discovery motions. 30 The twist on this standard procedure is to
require discovery of the particulars of every unadjudicated act in addition
to discovery for the capital offense itself. Such motions are to be made
pursuant to Rule 3A: 11 of the Supreme Court of Virginia,3 1 Brady v.
Maryland,32 (which specifically dealt with exculpatory evidence at the
capital penalty phase), and, Giglio v. United States.33 Additionally, as a
result of the United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in Kyles v.
Whitley,34 Brady evidence includes evidence bearing on the thorough-
ness and good faith of the police investigation, including the investiga-
tion of other suspects. Kyles, therefore, may be especially valuable when
dealing with unadjudicated acts since the Commonwealth has decided
for some reason not to prosecute the act. If the reason fornon-prosecution
was insufficiency or conflicting evidence, the defense is entitled under
26 An example of this type of motion can be found in the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual.
27 But see Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 445 S.E.2d 670
(1994) and case summary of Breard, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No.
1, p. 19 (1994).
28 Even though the Commonwealth is required to give the defense
notice of the acts it intends to introduce to show future dangerousness, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59
(4thCir. 1995), cert.grantedsub nom. Gray v.Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 690
(1996), that Gray did not have a constitutional right to some minimum
level of advance notice of the particulars of these acts. See also case
summary of Gray, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 16 (1995).
Therefore, it should be argued that in the interest of fair play and judicial
efficiency, the Commonwealth must give the defense ample notice of
such acts.
29 The importance of building a penalty phase defense prior to trial
cannot be overemphasized since the time span between a conviction and
the penalty phase of a trial is severely limited. See Chipperfield, Prepar-
ing Mitigation Prior To GuiltPhase, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No.
2, p. 19 (1989).
30 An example of these types of motions can be seen in the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual.
31 For other methods of discovery such as subpoena duces tecum
and the Freedom of Information Act, see Heavner, Leaving No Stone
Unturned: Alternative Methods of Discovery in Capital Cases, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 38 (1995).
32 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
33 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
34 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1569 n.13 (1995). See also case summary of
Kyles, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 4 (1995).
35 Under this statute, the defendant can acquire a mental health
expert if the defendant can make a showing that the defendant is indigent
Kyles to know the exculpatory evidence that makes the Commonwealth
believe the case is weak. Therefore, when requesting discovery, the
defense should consistently refer to Kyles' expansion of Brady/Giglio
and demand all exculpatory information for unadjudicated acts.
This aggressive approach forces the Commonwealth to evaluate the
actual merits and pitfalls of introducing unadjudicated acts. It also gives
the defense more information from which to combat the effectiveness of
unadjudicated acts. If adhered to, such steps will slow the prosecutorial
machine and allow the courts and the defense to keep pace.
C. Motions for an Expert to Refute Evidence of Future
Dangerousness
With forensics playing such a substantial role in modem jurispru-
dence, the acquisition of an expert is invaluable. In a capital case, it is a
necessity, because much of the evidence relied upon by the Common-
wealth will be supported by an expert's technical knowledge. By acquir-
ing experts as part of the defense team, the defense will be able to
adequately cross-examine the Commonwealth's experts and note dis-
crepancies in different scientific disciplines. Even the Virginia legisla-
ture has noted this need and enacted section 19.2-264.3:1 of the Virginia
Code allowing for state funded experts for the defense under certain
circumstances.
35
In addition to 3:1 experts, defense experts can also be acquired
under the authority of Ake v. Oklahoma,36 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that when the assistance of an expert is a basic tool
of defense, a denial of this expert would be a violation of due process.
Though Ake's scope was initially limited to mental health experts, its
reach has grown considerably. 37 Consequently, it is beneficial to useAke
and that the defendant is charged with capital murder. See Murtagh,
Mitigation: The Use of a Mental Health Expert in Capital Trials, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 16 (1989).
36 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
37 As evidence ofthebroad expansion ofAke, seeLittle v.Armontrout,
835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("There is no principled
way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts.")
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); see also United States v. Patterson,
724 F.2d 1128, 1130 (5th Cir. 1984) (defendant entitled to expert when
expert testimony is pivotal); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1027
(4th Cir. 1980) (defendant denied equal protection, due process and
effective assistance by court's failure to provide a pathologist to assist
with defense); United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823,829 (2d Cir. 1976)
(defendant entitled to fingerprinting expert); Washington v. State, 800
P.2d 252, 253 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (Ake applied to defendant's
motion for psychiatrist, forensic odontologist and chemist); State v.
Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989) (failure to grant defendant's
motion for fingerprint expert at public expense was reversible error);
State v. Carmouche, 528 So. 2d 159 (La. 1988), clarifying, 527 So. 2d.
307 (La. 1988) (in capital cases, "any reasonable request of the defen-
dant" for expert assistance "should be granted"; trial court should have
granted defendant's requests for "a neurologist and a psychiatrist and any
additional experts that these doctors deem necessary," as well as "experts
in fingerprint analysis and serology"); State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648,
656-58 (N.C. 1988) (Ake extends to any expert as to which defendant
makes threshold showing of need, including, inter alia, fingerprint
expert); State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987) (defendant
entitled to intoxication expert to "assist him in the evaluation, prepara-
tion, and presentation of his intoxication defense"); Thornton v. State,
339 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. 1986) (defendant entitled to funds to employ
assistance of forensic dental expert).
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in motions requesting other experts necessary to the defense. 38 Some
examples of experts that can prove beneficial in combatting future
dangerousness consist of mental health, ballistic and fingerprint experts,
chemists. Extremely helpful may be experts who can explain to juries
how studies have shown that future dangerousness can be reliably
predicted especially for those convicted of capital homicide. 39 After
acquiring information pursuant to these types of requests and motions, an
attack can be made on the future dangerousness aggravating factor
through motions in limine.
D. Motions in Limine
Motions in limine should first be utilized to attack the relevancy of
any acts used to show future dangerousness. Second, they should
confront the prejudicial nature of such evidence. Through such a motion,
the defense team can force the Commonwealth to more fully articulate
its reasons for using these acts to show future dangerousness. Such a
confrontation helps reveal the particularities of these acts and forces the
Commonwealth to reexamine its case in aggravation.
In dealing with the suppression of unadjudicated acts, the defense
should consistently stress the veracity problems of such evidence. As
noted earlier, the lack of any minimal standards of proof concerning
unadjudicated acts seems to run contrary to the requirement of guided
sentencing discretion. It is necessary that these motions be made pursu-
ant to the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in order
to preserve these issues in case of a federal appeal.
Moreover, by challenging unadjudicated acts pre-trial, the trial
judge is made aware of the Commonwealth's intended use of irrelevant,
prejudicial and unproven information that may be unconstitutional. The
Commonwealth, for example, in the past has introduced alleged acts such
38 An example of this type of motion can be seen in the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse Trial Manual.
39 See infra note 40. For the names of experts on the inability to
predict future dangerousness, contact the Clearinghouse.
40 Fry v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413,417, 463 S.E.2d 433,435
(1995). A motion in limine would stress that evidence of grave robbing
is highly inflammatory, yet is a non-violent crime and is not probative of
the defendant's danger to the community.
as grave robbing,40 reckless driving,41 and a double homicide.42 It is the
defense's responsibility to remind courts and the prosecution to adhere
to the Gregg/Godfrey mandate.
E. Motions to Define "Future Dangerousness" Language
By way of either motions for clarification or jury instructions, the
defense should request that the court bring meaning to the terms used in
section 19.2-264.4(C) of the Virginia Code. Each motion should refer to
the GregglGodfrey language, specifically noting the requirement for
"clear and objective standards" that provide "specific and detailed
guidance" for the jury. These motions should emphasize the definitional
problems of the statute and possible solutions to remedy the situation.
Such remedies should reflect the need to define "probability" in relation
to "beyond a reasonable doubt," as well as the scope of "prior history"
and the meaning of "continuing serious threat to society." Only by
forcing the court to deal with these definitional problems, can the defense
attorney begin to bring meaning to the amorphous language of Virginia
death penalty law.
III. Conclusion
The meaning and application of the future dangerousness aggravat-
ing factor has fallen far short of the GregglGodfrey mandate. Neverthe-
less, the Commonwealth of Virginia has continued to ignore the funda-
mental flaws inherent in the statutory scheme of Virginia death penalty
law. In essence, Virginia's machinery of death has continued to operate
without guidance or repair. As a result, the defense attorney may be the
only means by which the arbitrary and capricious implementation of the
death penalty can truly be avoided.
41 Roach v. Commonwealth, 1996 WL 88107, *3 (Va.). A motion
in limine would severely question how reckless driving is probative of
the defendant's future dangerousness.
42 Gray v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub.
nom. Gray v. Netherland, 116 S. Ct. 690 (1996). In Gray, the prosecutor
introduced evidence of an unadjudicated double homicide without
adequate notice or revelation that someone else was the prime suspect
